Cycling through Elections:
The Political Consequences of the Tour de France

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Abstract

Do place-based interventions that raise visibility and economic activity affect far-right voting? We study the Tour de France (TdF) as a case of brief but highly visible exposure that combines economic activity with symbolic recognition. Using variation in the annual TdF route between 2002 and 2022, we show that exposed municipalities experience declines in far-right support of 0.03–0.04 standard deviations. The effect exceeds 0.1 standard deviations in recent elections and is strongest in poorer areas and in towns with high prior far-right support. We find evidence consistent with the symbolic mechanism and mixed evidence for the economic one. TdF exposure increases local GDP per capita, effects on voting are larger when French riders win stages, and a two-wave survey around the 2025 TdF provides suggestive evidence that residents in exposed towns report greater pride and recognition. These results contribute to research on geographic inequalities, symbolic politics, and the electoral consequences of place-based interventions.

"When the Tour comes to town the whole place goes crazy. For the five days or so during which the race is arriving, setting up, conducting medical checks, presenting the riders and of course holding the opening prologue TT and the start of stage one, the town belongs to the Tour... In 1990 the Tour gave the Futuroscope theme park in Poitou-Charentes a big publicity boost." (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023, p. 129)

1 Introduction

The 1990 Tour de France (TdF) launched its Grand Départ from Futuroscope, a science and multimedia theme park, in the Vienne department. The event substantially increased the park's visibility, which had previously struggled to attract media coverage (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023; Campos 2003). Visitor numbers doubled from 450,000 in 1988 to roughly 900,000 in 1990, and rose to nearly 3 million by 1997. This period also coincided with changes in voting patterns across Vienne. Specifically, municipalities not on the route of the TdF experienced an increase in far-right voting from 8.0% in 1988 to 10.2% in 1995 and 11.9% in 2002, which represents a total increase of 3.9 percentage points. In contrast, in Chasseneuil-du-Poitou, the municipality where Futuroscope is located, far-right voting rose from 8.4% in 1988 to 9.2% in 1995 and 10.3% in 2002, amounting to a 1.9 percentage point increase, which is less than half the increase observed in the other municipalities in Vienne not affected by the TdF. This trend is not isolated. More systematically, Figure 1 displays the association between additional exposure to the TdF and the 2022 far-right share. The figure shows a strong correlation, with areas hosting the TdF more often voting less for the far-right. These patterns raise a broader question: can brief interventions that increase visibility and economic activity, such as sporting or cultural events, affect vote shares for far-right parties in peripheral regions?

Existing research highlights structural drivers of far-right support. Communities experiencing deindustrialization, weak labor markets, and population decline have been central to the rise of radical-right parties across Europe (Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Guiso et al. 2017; Frey, Berger, and Chen 2018; Rodrik 2018; Eribon 2009; Gest 2016; Komlos 2018; Bolet 2021; Dehdari 2022; Pástor and Veronesi 2021). These accounts emphasize persistence, arguing that

Hosting Tour de France and 2022 Far-Right Vote

Dots represent conditional averages

Figure 1: The relationship between TdF exposure and far-right vote share in 2022. Municipalities more often on the route vote less for the far right.

economic decline and long-run exclusion entrench protest voting, which often goes to the far right. Existing work also emphasizes cultural and symbolic factors. Residents of peripheral communities often feel neglected or invisible, which fuels a sense of lost status and resentment toward metropolitan elites (Cramer 2016; Gidron and Hall 2017; Mutz 2018). Given these accounts, one might expect temporary interventions like the TdF to matter little for political behavior.

We argue instead that even brief but salient place-based interventions can reduce far-right support. To explain this, we propose two potential channels. First, materially, place-based interventions can increase local economic output, which reduces structural economic marginalization that far-right narratives emphasize. Second, symbolically, highly salient interventions can bring recognition and visibility to peripheral towns, which helps reframe them as valued parts of the national community. Both mechanisms may shift perceptions related to neglect and exclusion that radical-right platforms often emphasize.[1] We therefore expect certain place-based interventions to reduce support for the far right, especially in poorer municipalities and

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[1]Sustained tourist inflows can produce different civic outcomes. On the Camino de Santiago, association density and turnout declined after the route's revival as congestion reshaped urban life (Maycas-Sardi 2025). Our study instead examines electoral responses to brief TdF exposures, which last only a few weeks and cover wide areas in France, with the routes varying each year.

in places with higher prior far-right support.

Several features of the TdF allow us to test this argument. The TdF is the third most watched sporting event in the world, after the Olympics and the World Cup (Korbosli 2025), and its route changes each year. Municipalities may apply to host stage starts or finishes, but the vast majority of towns along the route are selected by the organizers according to sporting and logistical criteria. This design creates plausibly exogenous variation in exposure. We combine data on the route of the TdF between 2002 and 2022 with municipal-level electoral and economic data. For the main analysis, we rely on a counterfactual imputation estimator that addresses the potential pitfalls of two-way fixed effects models estimated by OLS (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2024) to show that exposure to the TdF reduces far-right vote share by 0.03–0.04 standard deviations on average, and reaches 0.13 in the 2022 presidential election and 0.16 in the 2022 legislative election. The effect is largest in 2022, the highest far-right year in our period (Appendix A), which likely brought in newer, less loyal supporters. A high-profile intervention like the TdF could therefore have shifted more votes that year.[2] Across the full period, the effects persist for several years, are stronger in poorer municipalities and those with prior far-right support, and increase when French riders win stages. We also show that exposure increases local GDP per capita, though find no effect on local employment. Using a brief, non-representative two-wave online survey fielded around the 2025 Tour, we find suggestive evidence that short-run perceptions of symbolic recognition increased in areas on the route. The results are robust across alternative treatment definitions and counterfactuals, placebo randomization inference, and different geographic aggregations.

This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to an important debate on why citizens vote for the far right. One view holds that prejudice, ethnocentrism, and immigration threat are the main drivers (Ivarsflaten 2008; Arzheimer 2009; Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller 2017; Dinas et al. 2019). A second view argues that far-right support rises where places are left behind by trade, automation, and financial shocks (Colantone and Stanig 2018b; Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch 2016; Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig 2021; Autor et al.

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[2]When we drop 2022, the average effect is smaller but remains negative and statistically significant. See Appendix D.

2020; Becker, Fetzer, and Novy 2017).[3] We find that even brief, positive interventions move votes away from the far right, which is in line with the left-behind accounts. At the same time, because our results are much larger in 2022, the year with the highest far-right vote in our period, they suggest that these interventions are especially effective when far-right support expands to less committed voters, while long-standing loyalists may continue to support the far right for other reasons.

Relatedly, we also contribute to research linking long-run decline and radical-right support. A large literature argues that deindustrialization, weak labor markets, and demographic decline generate entrenched protest voting that flows to radical-right parties (Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Guiso et al. 2017; Frey, Berger, and Chen 2018; Rodrik 2018; Eribon 2009; Gest 2016; Komlos 2018; Bolet 2021; Dehdari 2022; Pástor and Veronesi 2021). This work suggests that structural disadvantages are persistent drivers of extremism. Our results show instead that discontent in such places can be more elastic. Municipalities exposed to the TdF experience significant declines in far-right support, with the largest effects in poorer areas and towns where the far right was already strong. These patterns suggest that anti-establishment voting in left-behind places is not fixed and appears responsive to salient place-based interventions. While we do not argue that brief cultural events substitute for structural investment, our evidence shows that they can generate reductions in protest voting and may complement long run efforts to address disadvantages in peripheral areas.

Third, the paper highlights the importance of symbolic inclusion in shaping electoral behavior. While economic decline matters, recent research shows that perceptions of invisibility and loss of standing also influence support for the radical right (Cramer 2016; Gidron and Hall 2017; Mutz 2018). Interventions such as the TdF provide symbolic recognition by broadcasting peripheral towns to a national audience and framing them as part of the collective story of France. Our theory suggests that this visibility is important to undermine narratives of neglect on which radical-right appeals rely, while our empirical evidence shows that stage wins by French riders further reduce support for the far right on towns along these stages. Additionally, suggestive evidence from our survey indicates that respondents in areas that were on the

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[3]By left-behind places, we mean places that experience sustained economic decline with weak opportunities and perceived neglect (Rodríguez-Pose 2018).

TdF route felt more recognition and pride in their towns. In this way, we complement work on recognition of social groups and identities by showing that recognition of place also has electoral consequences. Related work on media environments demonstrates that when dominant outlets stop supplying a one-sided narrative, attitudes can shift for the cohorts socialized under that change (Foos and Bischof 2022). Our results highlight a similar mechanism in the effects of narratives, but operating through increasing coverage and visibility of places rather than partisan news supply.

Additionally, the paper contributes to research on the effects of sports on voting outcomes. Most existing work treats sports as irrelevant events with only incidental political consequences. Studies show that local sports victories can increase incumbent support by shifting voter mood without revealing anything about government performance (Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010; Busby, Druckman, and Fredendall 2017).[4] Other research shows that Monday Night Football broadcasts before U.S. elections can reduce turnout by raising the opportunity cost of time (Potoski and Urbatsch 2017). Beyond voting, defeats of European football teams with African players have been linked to protests against domestic governments in Africa (Kikuta and Uesugi 2023). Taken together, this literature often frames sports as distractions, shocks to citizens' mood, or sources of misplaced blame. We argue instead that large-scale events like the Tour de France can go beyond these channels. They can serve as place-based interventions that shape visibility and economic activity in ways that produce systematic and durable electoral effects. Finally, some existing research shows that sports can affect repression, propaganda, nationalist mobilization, and intergroup relations (Scharpf, Gläßel, and Edwards 2023; Gerschewski et al. 2024; Bertoli 2017; Rosenzweig and Zhou 2021; Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, and Campante 2020; Alrababah et al. 2021; Mousa 2020). Relatedly, Bertoli (2017) shows that international football victories can make states more aggressive externally, while Rosenzweig and Zhou (2021) finds that they can harden exclusionary attitudes toward refugees domestically. By contrast, Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, and Campante (2020) demonstrate that national football successes in Africa reduce ethnic salience and lower interethnic violence. We contribute to this literature by showing that major sporting events can reduce political extremism and that

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[4]But also see Fowler and Montagnes (2015); Müller and Kneafsey (2023).

electoral behavior is an important political consequence of these events.

Left-Behind Places, the Far-right, and Cultural Events

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the concept of "left-behind places" has emerged as a central theme in discussions on geographical inequalities (Pike et al. 2024). These post-industrial and rural areas experience economic stagnation, population decline, and structural disadvantages that limit their economic recovery (Betz 1994; Ford and Goodwin 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo 2015). Research in economic geography has long emphasized that economic activity is distributed unevenly, which leaves declining regions disadvantaged by the clustering of economic productivity elsewhere (Weber 1976; Hooghe and Marks 2016). Recent research shows that these disparities not only affect wages and employment opportunities but also shape political preferences. Communities facing persistent decline often interpret their marginalization as evidence of neglect, making people there more receptive to parties that promise protection, recognition, and a break from established elites.

This section reviews the mechanisms linking decline to far-right support, including local economic shocks from trade and technology, selective out-migration that changes demographic composition, cultural backlash and perceived status loss, and the erosion of local institutions. Taken together, this research shows how structural disadvantages lead to political disaffection. Our theory builds on this and argues that brief but highly visible interventions, such as major cultural and sporting events, can push back against these dynamics in two ways. First, they bring short-term economic activity into struggling towns through jobs and spending. Second, they place those towns in the national spotlight, reframing them as visible and valued parts of the country. Both channels address the central grievances documented in the existing literature, as we summarize in Table 1.

Economic Shocks, Cultural Backlash, and Far-right Voting

A large comparative literature ties local economic shocks to support for the far right. Places affected by import competition experience job losses, wage pressure, and firm exits, which raise support for protectionist and anti-establishment platforms (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Colantone and Stanig 2018a; Rodrik 2018). The effects are stronger where manufacturing

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Grievance in the literature	Far-right appeal	Effect of TdF exposure
Economic marginalization Trade/automation shocks; weak local demand; job loss (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Colantone and Stanig 2018a; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020; Rodrik 2018)	Protectionism; anti-globalization frames; promises to bring back jobs and protect local industry	Short-run demand: visitors increase spending on food and services. Potential for longer economic effects with more visitors later. Effects challenge claims that national economic activity passes over these towns.
Migration Exit of people/businesses; arrival of foreigners (Petrin, Schafft, and Meece 2014; Carr and Kefalas 2009; Dancygier et al. 2024)	Narrate local decline; blame foreigners for lack of jobs/services; voice via protest voting when local opportunities are scarce	Traffic brings outside customers to local markets and supports businesses in the exposure period; shared town-level occasions reinforce place attachment and counter narratives about lack of local opportunities/future.
Geographic exclusion Distance from decision centers; service centralization; rare coverage of peripheral areas (Cremaschi et al. 2024; Petrin, Schafft, and Meece 2014; Moretti 2012; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan 2009)	Rhetoric about being forgotten; anti-elite appeals; far-right voting in response to neglect	Inclusion and live coverage highlights towns/landmarks; nationally visible signal of belonging; protesters use race days to gain visibility (Zaretsky 2019; Remande and Noé 2025).
Status loss and cultural threat Perceived status decline; identity threat; immigration salience (Oesch 2008; Cramer 2016; Gidron and Hall 2017; Mutz 2018)	Identity protection; law-and-order; anti-migrant/minority views	Coverage that highlights local heritage with nationally salient moments signals belonging within nation.

Table 1: Grievances linked to far-right support, corresponding appeals, and how exposure to the TdF can shape them.

dominates and labor markets are weak because workers have fewer outside options. Automation removes many low- and middle-skill jobs in industrial regions and undermines local tax bases (Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2009; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020). Similarly, the centralization of public services reinforce the sense that some towns have slipped in national priority (Cremaschi et al. 2024). In short, the negative effects of trade, technology, and service reduction often concentrate risk on some communities, and voting responds to that.

Migration patterns can also contribute. Younger and more educated residents move to growing cities, leaving smaller places with aging populations, fewer workers, and less connected to expanding sectors (Petrin, Schafft, and Meece 2014; Carr and Kefalas 2009; Maxwell 2019). Out-migration changes who is left to vote, weakens local networks, and reduces the number of organizations that tie towns to regional and national institutions. In many Western democracies, far-right parties perform well in areas that suffered from industrial decline and population loss (Pike et al. 2024; Dancygier et al. 2024; Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer 2020). In such contexts, even the arrival of immigrants can also be perceived as a threat, as they are sometimes blamed for taking the jobs of citizens, adding pressure to social welfare, or due to cultural differences (Hopkins 2010; Gennaro 2025; Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; Vasilopoulos, McAvay, and Brouard 2022). Studies show that these concerns are felt the most in left-behind or economically declining places, where immigration becomes politicized and linked to perceptions of neglect and competition (Hopkins 2010; Goodwin and Milazzo 2017).[5]

In addition to material factors, scholars have documented the importance of culture and status. Residents in small towns and rural areas report that national policies reflect metropolitan priorities rather than their own views and occupations (Cramer 2016; Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; Eribon 2009). Under such conditions, far-right appeals to national community and public order, can gain traction as they promise to restore social status and recognition (Oesch 2008). This helps explain why support for far-right parties can occur even when individual finances are stable, as perceived status loss and group decline predict radical-right preferences (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Gidron and Hall 2017; Mutz 2018). Parties then anchor these perceptions to concrete issues, such as immigration, the scope of EU authority, and crime and disorder, so

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[5]On the other hand, some studies also find little support for the relationship between increased immigration and far-right voting. For example, see Hill, Hopkins, and Huber (2019).

that arguments about policy become arguments about whose communities count nationally (Hopkins 2010; Oesch 2008).

These experiences can translate into far-right voting or withdrawal from politics. Sustained downturns are associated with lower confidence in institutions and stronger anti-elite sentiment (Algan et al. 2017; Foster and Frieden 2017; Guiso et al. 2019). Existing research links distrust to far-right voting when a credible protest option exists and to abstention when it does not (Shaffer 1981; Hetherington 1999; Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011; Bélanger and Nadeau 2005). Figure 2 shows the concentration of far-right voting in the 2022 French elections. As can be seen, much of the far-right vote in France comes from rural and post-industrial areas in France, while larger cities have seen less far-right voting.

**Figure 2:** Far-right vote share in French presidential and legislative elections in 2022. The map highlights spatial concentration of far-right support outside of urban areas.

The TdF as a Place-based Intervention

Place-based interventions can change two factors that matter in left-behind places: what happens on the ground in the days around the event and how the place is shown to the country.

The first is a material channel that runs through local spending and job creation. The second is a symbolic channel that can increase recognition, local pride, and a sense that the periphery is more visible. Both channels can directly shape the grievances discussed earlier.

Material Mechanism

Sporting interventions, such as the TdF can have important economic consequences.[6] When the Grand Départ was held in Brest in 2021, the metropolitan planning agency ADEUPa estimated direct local gains of roughly €4.35 million and reported a ratio of about three euros returned for each public euro, based on lodging, food, transport, retail activity, and municipal works that hired local contractors (Région Bretagne 2021). Small towns can significantly benefit from such inflow. Chorges, a commune of about 2,600 residents in the Hautes-Alpes, paid €100,000 in hosting fees in 2013 and another €50,000 for roadworks. The deputy mayor explained that the council cut association subsidies and postponed projects to finance the bid because they expected trade and visibility to follow (Izambard 2013). Sponsors describe the same logic from their side. The TdF is organized by Amaury Sport Organisation (ASO), whose head of media and partnerships explained that the advertising caravan is essential because it simulates local consumption before the peloton arrives (Korbosli 2025). The caravan runs with around 160 vehicles over more than 6,000 kilometers, draws an estimated 12 million roadside spectators across three weeks, and distributes on the order of 14 million small giveaways that bring families into the square and into nearby shops when the traffic opens again (Ouest-France 2024).

In Toulouse, which hosted stages in 2025, the local agency reported hotel bookings more than 20 percent higher than the previous July (Bascoul 2025). Still, the economic effects are not limited to the towns that host stage starts or finishes. Because ASO assigns hotel accommodations rather than letting teams choose, riders and staff are spread across a wider set of nearby communes. This means that villages along the route end up with booked hotels, bus traffic, and full restaurants even if they are not start or finish cities (Festor 2025). Participation events also extend the economic effects long after the TdF is over. L'Étape du Tour, which now attracts over 16,000 amateur riders, brings another wave of tourism into the same roads and towns on

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[6]See Gratton, Shibli, and Coleman (2006) and Baade and Matheson (2016) for a discussion of the economic benefits and costs of sporting events.

different dates (Amaury Sport Organisation 2025). Professional cyclists too describe the long-lasting effect of the TdF. Warren Barguil, who won two stages in 2017, has said he sometimes chooses holiday destinations based on places he liked during the race, while, another cyclist, Benjamin Thomas explained that he has returned to Carcassonne several times since a 2022 stage after the TdF revealed it to him (Cogné, Burban, and Mée 2025).

This material channel can matter politically because it shapes a central frame used by far-right campaigns in declining regions. In particular, it challenges the idea that the national economy can continue to grow unevenly without helping peripheral regions (Colantone and Stanig 2018a; Rodrik 2018). With interventions such as the TdF, residents can easily observe hotels and cafes become full and people passing and consuming in their areas, while local clubs can use these events for fundraisers. Of course, such an intervention cannot repair decades of falling behind. But we should expect that, particularly in poorer areas, an intervention such as the TdF can have moderate effects on far-right voting.

Symbolic Mechanism

Salient interventions can also change how a place is seen and how residents feel it is valued. In 2023, 42.5 million people watched the TdF on French television (Sim 2023). This exceptional broadcast goes well beyond the race itself. Helicopter and drone shots linger on rooftops, church towers, and countryside, sometimes even entering historic buildings. Commentators frame these images as tributes to local heritage, so that peripheral towns appear as valued parts of the nation. Audiences respond to that symbolism. A 2016 survey reported that viewers ranked the beauty of the landscapes above the sporting result, implying that the TdF can essentially function as a moving advertisement for certain French regions (Festor 2016). Commentators on the TdF stress the same point yearly. Alexandre Pasteur, the lead commentator at France Télévisions, calls the TdF the only sporting event that "goes to meet the French," while fellow commentator Marion Rousse notes that "the most beautiful route is the one that passes in front of your house" (La Nouvelle République 2025; Gibert 2025). Former foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has also described the TdF as a "vector of influence," exporting French landscapes and culture worldwide (Franceinfo 2022). Sponsors echo this commentary. Quentin Fouvez, head of public relations at Škoda France, explains that "it's popular because

it's free" (Korbosli 2025). Riders and managers also contribute to these interpretations of the TdF. Jean-René Bernaudeau, long-time manager of the TotalEnergies team, describes it as "a wonderful popular celebration" and "almost like a religion" (Ezvan and Festor 2025).

Symbolically, the race has also signaled continuity even during major upheavals. In 1968, the TdF went ahead despite nationwide strikes (Jones 2022), and was not disrupted but reinterpreted during the gilets jaunes (yellow vests) movement, as roadside banners linked the *maillot jaune* to the *gilet jaune*, turning the event into a platform for rural and working-class voices (Zaretsky 2019). Organizers draw on this symbolism in commemorations. In 2025, they marked the fiftieth anniversary of the polka dot jersey (awarded to the leader of the mountains classification) and honored French cycling legends by naming climbs after Jacques Anquetil and Louison Bobet. Coverage framed these gestures as tributes to national heritage rather than simple branding of the TdF, which can reinforce the sense that the race connects present competition with a shared cultural heritage (Leblanc 2025).

The intervention can also run through French cyclists, whose victories and performances create focal points for collective pride and connecting local peripheral areas to national narratives. For example, Thibaut Pinot, who won 3 individual stages in the TdF over his career, drew major support when the Tour passed through the Vosges in 2019 and again in 2023. Crowds filled the valleys chanting his name, while national outlets likened the atmosphere to a family reunion, given the visible identification between rider and supporters (Festor 2023). Another prominent French cyclist, Romain Bardet generated the so-called "Bardetmania" in the Massif Central, while the memory of Raymond Poulidor, nicknamed "Poupou," still organizes roadside rituals decades after his retirement (Boana 2023). These cases suggest that a French rider's presence on television, cheered by clearly invested supporters, can make entire communities feel recognized. The symbolism does not depend on local origin alone. Any French stage win can be received as a national moment, with spectators treating it as validation that "their" country still counts in a race watched worldwide. Sometimes, fans can even take this to an extreme. During the 2025 edition, several newspapers published photographs of fans climbing onto cemetery tombs to glimpse the peloton, a scene that sparked debate about respect but also revealed how far people are willing to go to be part of the event (Cito 2025). These

cases show how strongly many in the French public identify with the TdF, which translates a sporting intervention into collective recognition.

The TdF can affect political outcomes because visibility and recognition may shape how people judge their town's place in the nation. During the gilets jaunes (yellow vests) protests period, demonstrators deliberately used race days to make themselves seen. The link between the two was clear, as the race leader's jersey is the *maillot jaune* (yellow jersey), and the protest uniform was the *gilet jaune* (yellow vest). When protests appeared on live television and watched by millions, the claim that peripheral France had been neglected gained prominence (Zaretsky 2019). The same logic is visible when events related to the TdF are canceled. In July 1982, a team time trial (a stage in which teams ride against the clock) from Orchies to Fontaine-au-Pire was blocked by striking workers and ultimately canceled. Local papers and radio kept describing it as a traumatic day because towns along the route lost both the expected day of trade and their guaranteed moment on national television (Remande and Noé 2025). These episodes show how inclusion in the TdF feeds broader stories of recognition and abandonment, which may in turn shape protest voting.

Evidence from other contexts suggests that similar symbolic shocks matter politically. Bertoli (2017) shows that international football victories increase the likelihood of interstate disputes, while Rosenzweig and Zhou (2021) find that they can intensify exclusionary attitudes toward refugees. Most relevant to our case, Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, and Campante (2020) find that football victories in sub-Saharan Africa can reduce identification with ethnic identity as opposed to national identity, increases trust in other ethnicities, and reduces intergroup violence. Related work shows that experimentally priming national identity can also expand interethnic trust and cooperation (Robinson 2016; Charnysh, Lucas, and Singh 2015). Taken together, this body of work suggests that symbolic events can either exacerbate or alleviate social divisions depending on context. It also suggests that national victories can sometimes strengthen identification with the nation rather than with smaller ethnic groups, and may have effects on political violence. In line with this broader literature, we argue that when the TdF brings visibility to peripheral towns, symbolic recognition can also shape political outcomes, in this case by reducing support for the far right.

Overall, this discussion leads to several empirical expectations. First, we expect exposure to the TdF to lower the far-right vote share, since local economic boosts and symbolic recognition both undermine narratives of neglect. Second, the reduction should be strongest in poorer municipalities and in places with prior far-right strength, where temporary economic inflows and rising visibility are most sharply in contrast with evidence of decline (Colantone and Stanig 2018a; Gidron and Hall 2017). Third, the material mechanism implies that exposure should raise local economic output and reduce unemployment. Fourth, the symbolic mechanism suggests that French stage victories may produce larger declines in far-right voting. Additionally, we expect more people to watch certain types of stages (mountain and time trials), which may increase visibility for these areas. On the other hand, coverage in these types of stages focuses more on the race and less on the towns, which may reduce actual visibility and exposure. Finally, we expect people exposed to the TdF to have a better economic perception and to feel more pride and national recognition for their towns.

The Tour de France

The TdF began in 1903 as a marketing strategy by *L'Auto-Vélo* newspaper (later *L'Auto*, which would eventually be succeeded by *L'Équipe*). It was founded by wealthy French sponsors who had left *Le Vélo* after its editor supported Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French army officer falsely accused of spying for Germany (L'Équipe 2003, p. 16). These industrialists withdrew their advertising from *Le Vélo* and founded the competing *L'Auto-Vélo*. To increase readership, *L'Auto* journalist Géo Lefèvre proposed a multi-stage race around France to editor Henri Desgrange (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023, p. 20). The inaugural 1903 edition featured 6 stages covering 2,428 kilometers, with 21 of 60 cyclists finishing this deliberately challenging race (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023, p. 24).

The TdF quickly established its significance. On the day it set off in July 1903, only a handful of spectators watched. During the same tour, 100,000 people turned up for the final stage in Ville d'Avray and another 20,000 attended the victory parade at the Parc des Princes (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023, p. 27). The effect on *L'Auto* was immediate, as circulation rose from about 30,000 to 250,000 by 1908, eventually peaking above 850,000

under Desgrange (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023, p. 23). The launch of "the greatest cycling event in the world," (L'Équipe 2003, p. 16) as the newspaper proclaimed, marked the decisive victory over *Le Vélo*, which published its final issue on November 20, 1904. What began as a media tactic became a national institution.

The TdF also plays a unique role in reinforcing national cohesion. As a "popular celebration" (Ezvan and Festor 2025), it brings the country together through a shared experience that transcends geography and class. Its strong identification with rural and working class France, often referred to as "France périphérique'—"peripheral France" (Guilluy 2024), deepens its resonance. French cyclists from provincial backgrounds receive fervent support in their home regions, turning the peloton's passage into a festive local reunion (Zaretsky 2019; Daheron and Lasjaunias 2023). The TdF is seen as more than a race, it is a cultural institution often likened to national monuments (Campos 2003) and each year, its itinerary links remote and central places into a unified national narrative. Fans can attend for free, whether in small towns or on open country roads, adding to its appeal (L'Équipe 2003). Its drama and carnival-like atmosphere also increased its popularity. As Alexandre Pasteur describes, it is *"le seul événement sportif qui va à la rencontre des Français"* (the only sporting event that goes out to meet the French), capturing its closeness to the public. The TdF's position in French identity solidified over time. It became a televised "theater" reaching over a billion viewers in 190 countries, while also drawing up to 12 million roadside spectators each year (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023, p. 12).

Route Selection

The TdF route selection has changed quite a bit since its inception, when the race began and ended in Paris with six clockwise stages totaling approximately 2,500 km including almost no mountain terrain (Laget, Edwardes-Evans, and McGrath 2023). Mountain stages were gradually introduced at Ballon d'Alsace in 1905, followed by the Pyrenees (1910) and the Alps (1911), increasing the total distance to over 5,000 km (L'Équipe 2003). The TdF expanded from its original format to 15 and later over 20 stages, with night racing gradually eliminated and the first foreign Grand Départ occurring in 1954 in Amsterdam (Futura 2022). Since 1975, the final stage has almost always ended on the Champs-Élysées, with the recent exception of

the 2024 Tour ending in Nice due to the Paris Olympics (Farrand 2025). Since the 1990s, the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) has established formal limitations on the TdF, capping races at 3,500 km over 15-23 days with two mandatory rest days and prohibiting the half stages (which were already eliminated following a riders' strike in 1978 (Velo (OutsideOnline) nd)).

For several decades, the TdF has been organized by ASO, a private company that owns and operates the race. Christian Prudhomme, general director of the TdF since 2007, oversees the overall planning and execution of the event while Thierry Gouvenou acts as the lead course designer (Velo (OutsideOnline) nd; Startt 2023). Prudhomme defines the broad vision for each edition, while Gouvenou handles the technical design of individual stages using site visits, Google Earth, and Strava data. ASO also verifies that every arrival site meets some logistical criteria and hotel availability requirements.

Each year, approximately 250 to 300 towns apply to host a stage, including some international cities (Futura 2022; Souque 2019). ASO sends delegates to evaluate candidate sites, with hosting fees standardized between €70,000 to €120,000 for arrival and departure towns, while Grand Départs can cost millions (Mortkowitz 2019; The Inner Ring 2019). These fees used to comprise around 50% of the total revenue in the 1970s, but their share now has decreased to only about 10% of the total revenue, while most of the income comes from television rights and sponsorships (The Inner Ring 2019). This financial situation allows the TdF to include remote towns even when local governments cannot pay full hosting fees, as sporting and visual considerations can override financial ones. Host towns must also fund required roadworks, such as surface improvements or roundabout removals, particularly for sprint finishes that require long, straight, smooth roads. Logistical constraints can also shape the decision on arrival towns, as the 4,500-person caravan requires dual-carriageway access and nearby hotel clusters (The Inner Ring 2019). Despite these costs, towns compete to host stages because of the significant economic and promotional benefits, as the Tour is broadcast in 190 countries and can substantially increase tourism.

The design of the route connecting the towns includes several criteria. ASO rotates the route, trying to cover each French region at least once every five years while ensuring that stages always include the Alps and Pyrenees (Souque 2019). Sporting balance remains important with

each edition typically including mountain blocks, time trials, medium-mountain stages, and flat stages. Visual spectacle is also key in driving many decisions, as organizers prioritize strong finishes, a variety of terrain including gravel roads and cobbles, and short explosive stages to ensure viewer interest (Velo (OutsideOnline) nd; Startt 2023; Farrand 2025). Heritage and aesthetic considerations influence routing as well, with stages often passing iconic sites like the Pont du Gard or Puy de Dôme (Startt 2023). The official route remains unknown until it is released in October of the preceding year, which adds an element of anticipation and media interest (Velo (OutsideOnline) nd; Startt 2023).

While the selection of departure and arrival towns involves a formal application process and financial contributions from local governments, the roads that connect these towns (and therefore the municipalities alongside them) are chosen solely by ASO according to internal sporting, logistical, and aesthetic criteria. These intermediate towns do not apply, do not pay, and have no role in the route decision. As a result, inclusion on the route for these municipalities is not strategic and does not reflect local demand or initiative. This feature is central to our empirical strategy. Our identification comes primarily from towns that fall within 10 kilometers of the connecting roads, not only the start or end points.[7] Moreover, since several of our specifications compare municipalities that are eventually on the route to each other (towns that are all exposed at some point), our identification in several specifications relies not on whether a town is ever treated, but on when it is treated. The year in which a municipality ends up on the route depends on the broader design of that year's Tour rather than on any local characteristics. This makes it possible to treat the timing of exposure as quasi-random.

Data and Research Design

Our empirical strategy combines measures of TdF exposure with electoral and socioeconomic data at the municipal level. These data allow us to test whether the TdF reduces far-right support, and whether any effects operate through the economic and symbolic channels outlined above. Table 2 summarizes the main measures we use, how they map onto the mechanisms, and how we operationalize them.

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[7]We use 10 km to account for measurement error of routes due to the projections of routes from available maps. In appendix K, we show the robustness of our results using several distance thresholds.

Measure / dataset	Mechanism	Operationalization
TdF route exposure	Overall effect and mechanisms	Commune coded as exposed if within 10 km of any stage since the last election (robustness tests in Appendix K use other distances).
Far-right vote share in presidential and legislative elections (2002–2022; extended back to 1974 in appendix)	Overall effect	Standardized vote share for RN/FN and Reconquête used as the main outcome. Heterogeneity by *prior far-right support* to examine whether effect concentrated in areas where baseline support was higher.
Municipal GDP per capita; municipal revenue per capita	Material channel	Ratios to national average, standardized. Test for short-run local economic activity. Heterogeneity by *local economic conditions* (poorer vs. wealthier communes) to examine if larger effects in disadvantaged areas.
Survey: economic index	Material channel	Index of questions on jobs, investment, commerce, and infrastructure. Measures perceived local economic dynamism.
French stage winner on a local stage	Symbolic channel	Dummy if town on a stage that was won by a French rider. Captures additional symbolic salience of nationally resonant victories.
Stage type (time trial, mountain, or other)	Symbolic channel	Dummies for time trials and mountain stages near a commune. Expectation unclear—more attention to these stages but also potentially more coverage of the race itself and less of the towns on the stage.
Survey: symbolic index	Symbolic channel	Index of questions on local pride, visibility, and recognition. Measures perceptions of symbolic inclusion and recognition of place.

Table 2: Summary of our main variables of interest to capture the overall effect as well as the material and symbolic channels.

Tour de France Route Data

To measure exposure to TdF at the municipal level over time, we construct a dataset that identifies which municipalities were included on the race route (not only as departure or arrival towns) for selected years. This is based on a combination of historical route maps and geographic data on French municipalities. In particular, we use the dataset[8] available from the data.gouv.fr platform, that lists almost all of the 35,000 French municipalities (*communes*) together with their geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude).

To determine which municipalities were on the TdF route in each year, we use a set of TdF maps downloaded from Wikipedia.[9] The maps for years 1928–2023 are all created by the same Wikipedia user, Andrei Loas.[10] These maps are manually drawn to approximate stage routes based on the best available sources. While not exact, the maps offer a consistent and reasonably accurate basis for historical comparison across years. The maps on Wikipedia are available in the raster PNG format. However, Andrei Loas kindly provided us with source files (used to generate the PNG files for publication) in the vector SVG format. We parse the XML tree included in each such SVG file, and we extract paths and objects corresponding to stage routes and departure and arrival locations. This way we obtain pixelwise coordinates of points along the TdF route.

After identifying route pixels, we convert them to geographic coordinates using the Mercator projection.[11] Finally, for each French municipality, we calculate the haversine distance to the nearest on-route pixel. A municipality is considered "on route" if this distance is below a pre-specified threshold, which we set to 10 kilometers. We set this threshold to allow for potential measurement error in the route reconstruction, since the projections from the maps introduced some measurement error. This threshold notably assigns 99% of departure and arrival cities as being on route. In Appendix K, we show the robustness of our main findings using a range of distance cutoffs. For mechanism tests, we also code stage type (time trial,

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[8]https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/communes-de-france-base-des-codes-postaux/.

[9]E.g., see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Tour_de_France#/media/File:Route_of_the_2023_Tour_de_France.png for the 2023 map.

[10]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Andrei_loas.

[11]The Mercator projection was used to draw the maps in the first place, according to Wikipedia metadata. We manually approximate the parameters of the projection by trying to visually align country borders, and we verify that all the maps for all the years use the same parameters.

or mountain, or other) and whether any stage passing a commune was won by a French rider (Wikipedia 2025).

Electoral Data

We obtain municipality-level electoral and socioeconomic data from *Une histoire du conflit politique*, which was compiled by Cagé and Piketty (Cagé and Piketty 2023). The dataset includes detailed results for all presidential and legislative elections in France from 1974 to 2022 in addition to demographic and economic indicators at the municipal level.

Our main political outcome of interest is support for far-right parties and candidates in presidential and legislative elections. We define the far right to include Rassemblement National (the National Rally), which was earlier called the Front National (National Front), with Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen as the leaders. In the 2022 elections, we also include Reconquête (Reconquest), founded by Éric Zemmour. Because these parties campaign heavily on grievances of neglect and exclusion, changes in their vote share provide a direct test of whether the TdF can reduce their appeals. We focus on elections from 2002 onward for the main analysis, following the institutional reform that changed presidential and legislative terms to a five-year cycle.[12] Since vote shares for the far-right have varied a lot during our time period in presidential and legislative elections, ranging from no votes to over 30%, we report results in standard deviations of vote share to make effect sizes comparable across years.

Economic Indicators

In addition to electoral data, we use the same dataset to examine local economic effects. In particular, we use municipal GDP per capita and municipal revenue per capita, both as percent of the national average.

Survey Data

To complement the observational analysis, we fielded an original two-wave survey online (through Facebook and Prolific) designed to measure the symbolic and material mechanisms through which the TdF might shape political attitudes.[13] The survey was administered in 2025. The pre-treatment wave was conducted in June and early July, before the start of the Tour,

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[12]In Appendix B, we show the results after extending coverage back to 1974.

[13]This study was pre-registered on AsPredicted (registration no. 235105).

while the post-treatment wave was conducted in late July and August, immediately following the passage of the Tour. Recruitment in the pre-treatment wave combined Facebook advertisements targeted to residents in France and French residents recruited through Prolific, while the post-treatment wave relied on Prolific only.[14] After restricting the sample to French nationals, the final dataset includes 188 respondents in the Facebook pre-treatment wave, 420 respondents in the Prolific pre-treatment wave, and 486 respondents in the Prolific post-treatment wave.[15]

The survey instrument (see Appendix O) measured three broad topics: (1) town sentiment, capturing symbolic recognition and pride in place; (2) perceived local economic effects, capturing the material mechanism; and (3) political attitudes, including vote intention, feeling thermometers toward far-right parties, and agreement with policy statements associated with far-right platforms. Assignment to treatment was defined by whether respondents reported that a stage of the TdF passed through their town. To capture symbolic salience, the questionnaire also embedded a priming experiment, where respondents were randomly assigned to answer TdF-related questions either at the beginning or at the end of the survey.[16]

We focus in the paper on two indices: a *symbolic index* and an *economic index*.[17] Both were constructed from survey questions measured on 5-point Likert scales. We reverse-coded items that were worded in the negative, so that higher values mean more positive symbolic or economic perceptions. We then standardized each item using z-scores. For each respondent, we computed the mean of the available standardized items. We then standardized these averages again to produce the final indices.

We constructed the *symbolic index* using the following items:

1. People elsewhere in France know about my town.

2. I feel proud to be from my town.

3. Our town often gets overlooked by national media and politicians (reverse-coded).

4. There are few opportunities to celebrate local culture and traditions publicly (reverse-

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[14]Recruitment through Facebook advertisements proved substantially more difficult and costly than anticipated, yielding a smaller pool of eligible respondents. As a result, we discontinued this after the pre-treatment round and relied exclusively on Prolific for the post-treatment wave. Appendix Figure A11 reports the results after restricting to the prolific sample only for both waves.

[15]We did not pre-register the nationality filtering in the pre-analysis plan.

[16]This simple priming experiment did not affect any of the outcomes. We report the results in Appendix Figure A12.

[17]We report the null results for the far-right outcomes in Appendix Figure A10.

coded).

5. My community has recently received positive national attention.

6. Towns like mine are often portrayed in a negative light in national conversations (reverse-coded).

7. I believe national events can help small towns like mine get the recognition they deserve.

We also constructed the *economic index* using the following items:

1. Local businesses in my area are struggling to stay open (reverse-coded).

2. It's hard to find a good job in this area (reverse-coded).

3. My town has become more economically dynamic in recent years.

4. Public investment in our area has been neglected (reverse-coded).

5. I've noticed more tourists visiting my town recently.

6. Prices are rising, and many people here are struggling financially (reverse-coded).

7. Roads and infrastructure in my area are in good condition.

Research Design

Our identification strategy exploits the fact that the TdF route changes yearly, exposing different municipalities to the TdF in different years. This variation allows us to compare municipalities that were on the route in the lead-up to a national election with those that were not, while controlling for time-invariant differences between municipalities and common election-year shocks. The key assumption is that, conditional on fixed effects and controls, the timing of exposure to the TdF is exogenous with respect to political and economic trends at the local level.[18] In the next section, we test one implication of this assumption, which is whether being treated had an effect on the outcome in the pre-treatment periods (see Figure 5).

Our main regression equation is:

$$Y_{mt} = \beta \text{TdF}_{mt} + \gamma X_{mt} + \delta_m + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{mt} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{mt} is the outcome of interest for municipality m in election year t, such as vote share

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[18]This is supported by how towns along the connecting roads are chosen. Unlike towns at the start or finish of stages, intermediate towns do not apply or pay and are selected by organizers for sporting and logistical reasons, making the timing of their exposure unlikely to respond to municipal conditions.

Figure 3: Visualization of the identification strategy using variation in the TdF route. The maps show municipalities within 10 km of the TdF route in recent years. Left: towns reached by the TdF between 1995 and 2021 (used in the main paper). Right: towns reached between 1969 and 2021 (used in Appendix B to examine the robustness of the findings).

for far-right parties or a measure of local economic performance. The variable TdF_{mt} is equal to one if municipality m was *on the TdF route* (i.e., up to 10 km from the route in straight-line distance, according to our definition specified before) at least once in the five years preceding election t (since elections take place in 5-year cycles since 2002), and zero otherwise.[19] The vector X_{mt} includes observable time-varying controls, including indicators for whether the municipality served as a stage departure or arrival location, which may attract greater attention or resources, especially since cities apply for these positions. The terms δ_m and δ_t are municipality and election-year fixed effects, respectively, and ε_{mt} is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.[20]

Two-way fixed effects models can produce biased estimates when the effect is heterogeneous and units switch in and out of treatment status across periods (Goodman-Bacon 2021). The latter one is clearly a feature of our data, since the TdF route varies yearly and exposure is not permanent. To address these issues, we implement the counterfactual estimator (and the

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[19]The TdF usually takes place in July, while French elections often occur in spring. For elections in year n, we consider races that occurred in years $n-5$ to $n-1$ inclusive. This includes both presidential and legislative elections, which often take place in April-June.

[20]We also consider a more demanding clustering approach, in which we cluster standard errors at the municipality and TdF stage level. This additionally allows for correlation of errors across municipalities that share the same stage exposure. In the case where a municipality was part of multiple stages in the past five years, we assign it to the latest stage. This does not change our conclusions (see Appendix G).

event study model) proposed in Liu, Wang, and Xu (2024), which avoids negative weighting by imputing untreated potential outcomes for treated units. Under the functional form assumption of Equation 1 and strict exogeneity, Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess (2024) show that the counterfactual estimator is the most efficient linear unbiased estimator of the ATT. In our setting, strict exogeneity notably implies no anticipation (i.e., future TdF exposure cannot affect current outcomes), no feedback (i.e., past outcomes cannot influence TdF exposure), and no time-varying confounders correlated with TdF exposure (beyond what is captured by X_{mt} and the time fixed effects δ_t).[21] This estimator is valid in settings where units are entering and exiting the treatment. In fact, an interesting feature of counterfactual estimators is that we can study the average treatment effects of switching on, but also switching off, exposure to the TdF (see Appendix L.2). In all cases, standard errors are estimated using the nonparametric block bootstrap clustered at the municipality level with 1000 bootstrap iterations.

We estimate our main specification on three samples. The first includes all municipalities, even those never exposed to the TdF. The second restricts to municipalities that are exposed at least once. The third restricts further to municipalities located within 30 kilometers of the route. These three samples allow us to assess the robustness of our estimates under varying definitions of the control group. The full sample maximizes statistical power. However, one may worry that never-exposed municipalities follow systematically different trends in outcomes for reasons unrelated to TdF exposure. Restricting to municipalities exposed at least once improves comparability by ensuring all units are at risk of treatment, which strengthens the plausibility of our strict exogeneity assumption. Limiting the sample to municipalities within 30 kilometers narrows the comparison set to units that are similar in observable and unobservable characteristics, thereby further reducing the likelihood that unaccounted time-varying confounders drive our results.

In addition to the main model for all the election years, we are interested in the effects of TdF exposure per election. This is relevant in France, where far-right support has increased over time. We use the counterfactual estimator to measure ATTs per election year. This boils down to averaging the difference between the observed outcomes of treated units and their

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[21]Appendix L.1 reports an alternative analysis where we assume that once a unit has been on the route of the TdF, its treatment status always remains on.

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counterfactual outcomes, assuming they were untreated, for each election year separately.

In addition, we fielded a two-wave survey experiment around the 2025 Tour. Respondents in France were surveyed before the race in June–early July, and after the race in late July–August. We then run the following regression:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Post}_t + \beta_2 \text{TdF}_i + \beta_3 (\text{Post}_t \times \text{TdF}_i) + \gamma X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \qquad (2)$$

where Y_{it} is the outcome for individual i at time t (either the symbolic index or the economic index), Post_t indicates the post-TdF survey wave, TdF_i indicates whether the individual resides in a municipality on the TdF route (as self-reported), and X_{it} includes demographic covariates (age, gender, education, income, employment, and survey source). The coefficient β_3 captures the difference-in-differences estimate of the relationship between TdF exposure and symbolic or economic outcomes. Analyses of political attitudes and of the priming experiment are presented in Appendix O.2. As this survey was fielded via Facebook (first wave) and Prolific (both waves), the sample is not representative of either type of town, and it changes between the two waves.[22] This analysis should thus be viewed as suggestive evidence rather than a clear causal test.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 shows, for each election year, how many municipalities were somewhere on the TdF route and how many hosted at least one departure or arrival in the Tours since the previous election (pre-election window). In every period, the race reached over 11,000 to more than 13,000 municipalities. Among those, only around 80 were departure or arrival towns. Table 4 shows how often each French municipality has appeared on the route in the pre-election windows since 1995.[23] Most towns have been exposed to the TdF at some point. Of those on the TdF, the vast majority appeared in only one or two windows. This shows both the reach of the

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[22]We report results in the appendix after restricting to the Prolific sample only, but respondents remain unrepresentative and change over time.

[23]We focus on the Tour's route in the years since the previous election, beginning with the 2002 elections.

race and the variation in how often towns are exposed, which is what our design exploits.

Table 5 shows the average municipal-level vote share of far-right candidates in each election year. In presidential elections, the vote share increased from 16.8% in 2002 to 33.5% in 2022. In legislative elections, far-right voting also increased from 10.8% in 2002 to 25.8% by 2022. Throughout this period, presidential elections consistently had higher far-right voting than legislative elections. In fact, until recently, the far-right had very few seats in the French parliament.

| | Municipalities that are... | | |
Year	On route	Departures	Arrivals
2002	13603	81	79
2007	13356	82	78
2012	11569	81	79
2017	12495	79	81
2022	12370	82	81
Total	28963	276	232

Table 3: Summary of municipalities on the TdF route between 1995 and 2021 by election year.

| | Municipalities that are... | | |
Count	On route	Departures	Arrivals
0	5823	34510	34554
1	11146	193	138
2	8012	51	49
3	5041	22	24
4	2720	6	15
5	2044	4	6

Table 4: Number of pre-election windows in which municipalities appeared on the TdF route between 1995 and 2021.

Main Effects

We begin by showing the main regression results. The results presented in Table 6 show that exposure to the TdF route lowers the far-right vote share in both presidential and legislative elections.[24] In the fully specified models (column 3 of each panel), which include controls for population, economic indicators, occupational structure, tax levels, exclude the departure/arrival

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[24]We present additional specifications in Appendix Table A5

Year	Presidential			Legislative		
	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	n
2002	0.168	0.067	13,603	0.108	0.059	13,606
2007	0.121	0.054	13,356	0.045	0.032	13,387
2012	0.200	0.069	11,569	0.141	0.069	11,594
2017	0.252	0.091	12,495	0.156	0.084	12,526
2022	0.335	0.095	12,370	0.258	0.101	12,393

Table 5: Far-right vote share in presidential and legislative elections, 2002–2022.

municipalities (which can bid to host the TdF), and only include towns that were treated at least once (thus removing places that were never on the TdF route), TdF exposure reduces the far-right vote share by 0.03–0.04 standard deviations. This represents a 0.33 percentage point decline in the far-right vote share in presidential elections and a 0.44 percentage point decline in legislative elections.[25]

While the average estimated effect of TdF exposure on far-right vote share may seem modest, this could be due to the historically low support for far-right parties in French national elections. Next, we disaggregate the results by election year. As figure 4 shows, the effect of TdF exposure is much larger in more recent elections. In 2022, it reaches 0.13 in the presidential election and 0.16 in the legislative election. During our study period, far-right support was highest in the 2022 legislative and presidential elections, which likely brought in many first-time, less committed voters and could help explain why the TdF produced a larger effect that year. In Appendix D, we show the main results excluding the 2022 elections. The effect size decreases but remains statistically significant.

Figure 5 presents event-study estimates using the counterfactual imputation estimator from (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2024), which addresses some limitations of two-way fixed effects models in the presence of treatment effect heterogeneity and staggered treatment timing. These concerns are particularly relevant here, as municipalities may enter or exit treatment status each year. Because national elections in France are always held in the spring and the TdF occurs in July, treatment in year t can only affect elections from year $t+1$ onward. Figure 5 shows that there

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[25]Appendix M shows the results using two alternative geographic units of analysis. Instead of focusing on the commune (municipality), we show the results using the living zone level and the commuting zone level in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The results remain substantively similar. Appendix J shows the effect of TdF on other political parties. We find some effects for the other parties but the results are not consistent across elections.

	Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share			
	(in standard deviations)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Presidential Vote				
TdF (indicator)	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%	11%	11%
National Average	23%	23%	22%	22%
Num. observations	165900	165900	135724	118594
Num. municipalities	33180	33180	27145	33064
Num. elections	5	5	5	5
Panel B: Legislative Vote				
TdF (indicator)	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%	11%	10%
National Average	15%	15%	15%	15%
Num. observations	170560	170560	140028	122395
Num. municipalities	34112	34112	28006	33998
Num. elections	5	5	5	5
Controls				
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Departure/arrival city		✓		
Extended controls			✓	
Sample restrictions				
Eventually exposed to TdF			✓	
No departure/arrival cities			✓	
Less than 30km from the route				✓

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in presidential and legislative elections, 2002–2022. Panel A reports results for presidential elections and Panel B for legislative elections. Columns add controls and restrictions sequentially. Appendix A5 shows the robustness of the results to alternative ways of adding the controls. The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

Figure 4: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share by election year. The top panel shows results for presidential elections and the bottom panel for legislative elections (2002–2022). Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are reported in standardized units of vote share. Regression results are presented in Appendix C.

is no effect of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in the two periods before treatment (lags at –1 and 0), for both presidential (top panel) and legislative (bottom panel) elections. We only observe a significant negative effect in the first election following TdF exposure (lead 1), consistent with the main findings.[26]

Presidential Elections

Legislative Elections

Figure 5: Event-study estimates of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in presidential (top) and legislative (bottom) elections. The estimates are based on the counterfactual imputation estimator. The outcome is measured in standard deviations. Regression results are presented in Appendix E.

To further examine the robustness of our findings, we implement two randomization infer-

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[26]Appendix L.1 conducts an alternative analysis where we assume that once a unit has been on the route of the TdF, its treatment status always remains on. Both approaches show that the treatment effect remains over the two years after hosting TdF.

ence procedures. First, we simulate a distribution of placebo treatment effects under the null hypothesis by repeatedly assigning TdF exposure randomly across municipalities within each election year. We preserve the number of municipalities treated per election but randomly reassign the TdF treatment status 1,000 times, re-estimating the model each time with municipality and year fixed effects. This generates a distribution of placebo coefficients that reflects the effect sizes one would expect to observe if TdF exposure were unrelated to the far-right vote share. Panel A of Figure 6 shows the observed treatment effect (red line) and the placebo distribution for presidential elections (left) and legislative elections (right). As is clear, the observed treatment effect is in the lower end of the placebo distribution, indicating that the estimated effect is highly unlikely to have appeared randomly.[27]

We also implement a more demanding approach that only exploits the timing of TdF exposure. Specifically, we reshuffle the years in which each stage took place, while holding fixed the spatial location of stages. This procedure generates placebo treatments that mimic the geography of TdF exposure. We randomly shuffle the timing of stages 1000 times, re-estimating the model each time with municipality and year fixed effects. The resulting placebo distribution therefore provides a stricter test: it asks whether the observed effect could arise purely from the particular years in which stages occurred, conditional on their geography. Panel B of Figure 6 shows the observed treatment effect (red line) and the placebo distribution for presidential elections (left) and legislative elections (right). Once again, the estimated effect is highly unlikely to have appeared randomly. This provides further support for the credibility of our findings.

Material and Symbolic Channels

We now turn to examining potential mechanisms behind the reduction in far-right vote share following TdF exposure. We begin by examining evidence consistent with the material channel. The TdF is a major national event that can attract tourism, media attention, and short-term spending, potentially stimulating local economic activity. To test this, we estimate the effect of TdF exposure on key local economic outcomes—specifically, per capita GDP and total municipal revenue, both expressed as a percentage of the national average, as well as the unemployment rate.

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[27]In Appendix N, we implement an additional randomization inference restricting the sample to municipalities that have been on the TdF route at least once.

Presidential Elections   **Legislative Elections**

Panel A: Randomization Inference Across Municipalities

Panel B: Randomization Inference Across Stages

Figure 6: Randomization inference test of TdF exposure effects. In Panel A, the figures show the distribution of placebo estimates from 1,000 random reassignments of TdF exposure for presidential elections (left) and legislative elections (right). In Panel B, the figures show the distribution of placebo treatment effects from random assignments of *stage-level* TdF exposure. In all figures, the true treatment effect is marked by a vertical red line.

Table 7 shows the results. TdF exposure significantly increases local economic output. In particular, municipalities exposed to the TdF have a 0.0052 standard deviation (0.14 percentage point or €56) increase in per capita GDP relative to the national average. While the effect on municipal revenue is positive, it is not statistically significant. These findings provide suggestive evidence that the TdF may improve short-term economic performance in host municipalities.

We also examine whether the effect of TdF exposure on far-right voting varies by local economic conditions. The economic benefits of TdF are likely to be more important in poorer or more marginalized areas, which are more likely to feel "left behind" and more susceptible to far-right appeals. To examine this, we interact TdF exposure with several indicators of local economic disadvantage and past far-right vote. We present the results in Table 8.[28] In both presidential and legislative elections, the effects of TdF exposure are strongest in poorer communes and in those with higher past far-right support. This is consistent with the idea that

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[28]We present the marginal effects of TdF exposure on presidential far-right vote share across local economic conditions and previous far-right voting in Appendix I.

	GDP per Capita (% of National Average)	Revenue per Capita (% of National Average)	Unemployment Rate (%)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
TDF (indicator)	0.0052**	0.0033	0.0006
	(0.0017)	(0.0020)	(0.0031)
SD of Dep. Var.	0.2604	0.2407	0.0600
National Average (2002–2022, Euros, current prices)	31787	34543	
Num. observations	717549	717549	717549
Num. municipalities	34169	34169	34169
Num. elections	21	21	21
Controls			
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 7: Estimated effects of TdF exposure on local economic outcomes. The dependent variables are municipal GDP per capita and revenue per capita, relative to the national average.

the TdF may reduce far-right voting by (at least) temporarily reducing feelings of neglect in vulnerable communities and those that voted for the far-right in the past.

We next test a symbolic mechanism with the idea that French stage victories in the TdF could increase a sense of pride or belonging, especially in municipalities that are "left behind." If French victories in stages that pass through certain areas strengthen feelings of national inclusion, it may reduce the appeal of far-right parties, which campaign on narratives of exclusion or alienation. To examine this, we estimate an additional specification that includes both a dummy for exposure to the TdF and an additional indicator for whether the stage was won by a French cyclist. We present the results in Table 9. The coefficient on the latter captures the additional marginal effect of French victories, beyond the general impact of TdF exposure. French victories are associated with an additional 0.019–0.020 standard deviation reduction in far-right vote share. These findings are consistent with the idea that moments of national pride and recognition may reinforce the impact of exposure to the TdF, thus reducing support for far-right parties even more.

We also examine whether effects vary by stage type.[29] Our expectation on this is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, mountain and time-trial days tend to be more performance-driven, with broadcasts tracking gaps and time checks, thus spending less coverage on the towns and

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[29]Time trials include both individual and team formats. Mountains include medium-mountain stages.

	Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share (in standard deviations)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Presidential Elections					
TDF	−0.032***	−0.066***	−0.079***	−0.033***	−0.041***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.003)
TDF × GDP Ratio PC (1995)		0.043***			
		(0.012)			
TDF × Revenue Ratio PC (1995)			0.055***		
			(0.012)		
TDF × Proportion Unemployed (1995)				−0.001*	
				(0.000)	
TDF × Past Far-Right					−0.047***
					(0.004)
Num. observations	165900	165900	165900	165557	132720
Num. municipalities	33180	33180	33180	33176	33180
Num. elections	5	5	5	5	4
Panel B: Legislative Elections					
TDF	−0.041***	−0.046***	−0.060***	−0.041***	−0.045***
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.003)
TDF × GDP Ratio PC (1997)		0.007			
		(0.013)			
TDF × Revenue Ratio PC (1997)			0.022		
			(0.014)		
TDF × Proportion Unemployed (1997)				−0.000	
				(0.000)	
TDF × Past Far-Right					−0.032***
					(0.005)
Num. observations	307008	307008	307008	306322	272896
Num. municipalities	34112	34112	34112	34110	34112
Num. elections	9	9	9	9	8
Controls					
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Heterogeneous effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in presidential and legislative elections by local economic conditions and previous far-right voting.

the landscapes themselves. On the other hand, these stages tend to be more exciting, which can draw more people to watch them. So we do not have a clear ex-ante expectation about the effects in these types of stages. Table 9 shows mostly mixed effects, with mountain stages reducing the effect size in presidential elections only, while time trials increase the estimated effect in legislative elections only.

| | Outcome: Vote Share (in standard deviations) | | | |
| | Presidential Elections | | Legislative Elections | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TDF (indicator)	-0.030^{***}	-0.034^{***}	-0.037^{***}	-0.039^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Etape won by a French cyclist	-0.019^{**}		-0.020^{**}	
	(0.006)		(0.007)	
Contre-la-montre (time trial)		0.015		-0.044^{***}
		(0.010)		(0.013)
Étape de montagne (mountain)		0.019^{**}		-0.009
		(0.006)		(0.007)
SD of Dep. Var.	0.112	0.112	0.107	0.107
Num. observations	165900	165900	170560	170560
Num. municipalities	33180	33180	34112	34112
Num. elections	5	5	5	5
Controls				
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓

$^{***}p < 0.001; {}^{**}p < 0.01; {}^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 9: Estimated effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share. The table reports the marginal effect of French stage wins as well as the effects by stage type (time-trial and mountain stages versus regular stages). Time trial include both individual and team formats. Mountain include medium-mountain stages. The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

Survey Evidence on Symbolic and Material Channels

As discussed, we also fielded short surveys before and after the 2025 TdF. The surveys were not representative and respondents varied between the two waves, so this evidence should be viewed as suggestive only. Figure 7 plots the pre/post means for treated and control towns on the economic and symbolic indices. In both cases, residents of TdF-route towns report more positive evaluations after the race, while residents of control towns show no significant change. The pattern is especially pronounced for the symbolic index, where treated respondents report higher pride and recognition of their town in the post-survey wave. Figure 8 presents the

difference-in-differences estimates. The point estimates are positive for both indices and statistically significant for the symbolic index. The economic index shows a smaller, not statistically significant improvement.[30]

Overall, the suggestive evidence from the survey is also consistent with the symbolic channel, which measures pride of local communities and visibility. This aligns with our argument that visibility and recognition are central aspects of the TdF. The fact that the effects are observed within weeks of the event also suggests that grievances in "left-behind" places might be responsive to highly salient but short-lived interventions. At the same time, we do not observe effects on far-right preferences in the survey. Given the limited sample size, the very short time horizon, and the fact that the survey is not representative, we view this evidence as suggestive only.


Figure 7: Survey means of symbolic and economic indices before and after the 2025 TdF. Respondents who reported their localities to be on the route of the TdF in 2025 are coded as treated and those who reported their localities to not be on the route are coded as control. The figure shows pre/post averages for treatment and control groups with 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) confidence intervals.

In open-ended responses asked in the post-tour survey wave, several people described effects that align closely with our theoretical expectations about the symbolic mechanism.[31] Several respondents highlighted the pride and recognition that came from seeing their community

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[30]We present the results by several subgroups in Appendix O.2.

[31]All quotes are translated from French by the authors and slightly edited for clarity.

Figure 8: Difference-in-differences estimates of TdF exposure on symbolic and economic indices. Respondents who reported their localities to be on the route of the TdF in 2025 are coded as treated and those who reported their localities to not be on the route are coded as control. Bars show 90% (thick) 95% (thin) confidence intervals. Regression results are presented in Appendix Table A16.

on national and international broadcasts. One explained that "seeing the town highlighted on a national and international scale strengthens the sense of belonging, with decorated streets, media presence, and a festive atmosphere." Another wrote that the Tour made them feel "as if my town really exists," while others stressed the symbolic value of visibility, noting that "it looked like our town was actually important" and that "it showcased the beauty and uniqueness of the city." Several respondents pointed to collective pride. One person observed that "everyone camps along the course, waits and cheers together, all problems disappear, only the community remains," and another said, "it brought people together, it made me love my town more." These quotes suggest the ways in which people view the effect of the TdF on visibility, pride, and recognition.

A few respondents also mentioned the material effects, though symbolic channels were often mixed in as well. Some accounts focused on short-term boosts to tourism and commercial activities. One noted that "it improves tourism in the city and gives it a bit of a facelift, making the town look renewed," while another explained that "it brings a lot of tourists and livens up the city." A third claimed that "many people continued to follow the Tour even after it passed through the town," suggesting a longer-term effect. Several linked these dynamics directly to local activities: "it made the town dynamic and alive," "it gave the city a festive character, with

shops collaborating and organizing activities," and "it allowed us to rediscover certain parts of the town that had been neglected."

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the effect of place-based interventions on voting for the far right. Using the case of the TdF, our analysis shows that even short-term, high-profile interventions can reduce extreme political preferences in economically marginalized areas. Municipalities along the TdF in the years preceding an election show a decrease in far-right vote share, reaching 0.13 in the 2022 presidential election and 0.16 in the 2022 legislative election. This was also the peak of far-right support in our period (Appendix A), which likely brought in less committed supporters and helps explain the larger effect that year. While excluding 2022 produces a smaller estimate, the effect remains negative and statistically significant (Appendix D).

Across the full period, the effects are strongest in poorer municipalities and those with historically higher extremist support. TdF exposure also increases local GDP per capita, though has no effect on unemployment. The estimate is also larger when French cyclists win, which is consistent with a symbolic mechanism. We complement these aggregate results with suggestive individual-level evidence from a two-wave survey conducted around the 2025 TdF. Respondents in TdF-route towns reported higher scores on the symbolic index after the event, while those in control towns showed no similar change. Open-text responses point to the same pattern. Taken together, the findings challenge the notion that long-run structural decline locks communities into supporting far-right parties. Instead, they suggest that feelings of neglect can decrease with temporary but powerful interventions. In Appendix H, we examine the persistence of the TdF effect on far-right voting. The results show that the effect seems to persist for at least a few years.

We consider several alternative explanations. One possibility is that reductions in far-right support result from investment in infrastructure completed in preparation for the TdF. Municipalities often finance roadworks or related improvements to accommodate the race, and such investments could plausibly influence voting. Yet the timing of effects is inconsistent with this interpretation. French elections take place in the spring and the TdF is held in July. If infras-

tructure is the driver, we would expect electoral effects to be visible in the same year, since investments are completed before the election. As Figure 5 shows, there is no effect in elections held in the same year as the TdF. Declines in far-right support appear only in subsequent years, consistent with the TdF's economic and symbolic impact during the event itself.

A second alternative is that residents reward local politicians for securing the TdF and that this translates into stronger support for national parties. This mechanism is unlikely for two reasons. First, local officials cannot determine whether their town is placed on the route. While municipalities may apply to host a stage start or finish, the vast majority of towns in our sample lie along the connecting roads and are selected unilaterally by ASO according to sporting and logistical criteria. Consistent with this, our estimates remain substantively similar when start and finish municipalities are excluded (column 3 of Table 6; see also columns 8–9 in Appendix Table A5). Second, French municipal politics tend to be highly personalized. Voters often support mayors based on their reputation and embeddedness in the local community rather than partisan affiliation, and such support does not necessarily extend to national elections. As one mayor put it, "The same people who gave me 72% in the first round of the municipal elections say to me "you know we're with you, it's great what you're doing, but we're voting [National Rally leader] Bardella because we're fed up." (Bordenet 2024). These weaken the claim that our results capture partisan credit-claiming.

A third explanation is that exposure to outsiders reduces far-right support through intergroup contact. The TdF does attract tourists and international media, but we think this mechanism is also implausible. The peloton remains overwhelmingly white and ethnically homogeneous. Fewer than one percent of WorldTour riders are Black, and only rare cases of riders from ethnic minority backgrounds have appeared in the TdF peloton into the 2020s (Challis 2024; Martínez-Cachero 2022). Some rare cases, such as Yohann Gène becoming the first Black rider to complete the TdF or Biniam Girmay winning a stage in 2024, are notable because they are exceptions (Carrey 2024; Ford 2025). Spectator crowds are also not particularly diverse for the TdF, as the majority are French and many non-French spectators come from neighboring countries with strong cycling cultures, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. As a result, residents are unlikely to encounter sustained intergroup contact with ethnic minorities through

the race. This evidence makes it unlikely that contact explains the observed electoral shifts.

A fourth possibility is not that exposure to the TdF reduces far-right voting, but that non-exposure increases it. Because we use municipalities not on the TdF route as counterfactuals, the estimated effects could be driven by these places voting more heavily for the far right, potentially out of frustration at being excluded. We think this explanation is unlikely for two reasons. First, the results are similar whether we include all municipalities (including those never exposed) or restrict the sample to municipalities that are eventually exposed, which might reasonably anticipate being on the route and thus feel excluded. This is shown in columns 1–3 of Table 6. Second, Appendix Figure A7 examines municipalities that lost exposure (places once on the route but no longer included) and finds point estimates that are negative and close to zero. This suggests that lack of exposure does not generate backlash.

Our study has a few limitations. Our main analysis begins in 2002, when presidential and legislative terms were synchronized, but the far right had been gaining ground before then. To address this, we extend the analysis back to 1974 and find substantively similar effects in Appendix B. Another concern relates to how we treat exposure to the TdF, as the political effect of being on the route may be permanent once it occurs. We test this by assuming that municipalities remain treated after their first exposure in Appendix L.1. A third concern relates to using municipalities as the unit of analysis. On the one hand, the comparison between municipalities on the route and farther away controls may not be realistic. We deal with this in column 4 of Table 6, by restricting the control to municipalities within 30 km of the route and find similar results. Another concern is that the unit of analysis may be too small. Municipalities are small, and local politics may be shaped by broader labor markets or service areas. In Appendix M, we aggregate outcomes to larger geographic units such as living zones and commuting zones. Across these approaches the results remain stable, which increases confidence that they are not due to modeling choices.

Another limitation is spatial dependence. Exposure to the TdF is not randomly scattered across the map but assigned in stage-length corridors, so nearby municipalities are often treated together. If those municipalities also share unobserved shocks, standard errors clustered only at the municipal level may understate uncertainty. To address this, we re-estimate models with

standard errors clustered at the stage level in Appendix G, which allows correlation within each corridor. We also implement stage-level randomization inference that reassigns entire stages rather than individual municipalities, preserving the dependence structure of treatment in Panel B of Figure 6. A related concern is how we define exposure to the TdF. Our baseline considers municipalities within 10 km of the route as treated, due to potential measurement error in constructing the routes from TdF maps. To test the sensitivity of our findings to this choice, we vary the distance threshold. The results remain stable across narrower and wider definitions, as shown in Appendix K. A final limitation relates to the survey evidence. While the survey provides useful individual-level insights into the symbolic channel, it is not representative of the French population and respondents changed over time. Its findings should therefore be read as suggestive and complementary to our aggregate analysis.

In terms of policy, the findings should not be viewed as suggesting that brief place-based interventions can replace long-term strategies to address regional inequality and feelings of political exclusion. Durable improvements in disadvantaged areas depend on investment in infrastructure, human capital, and strong local institutions. What our results show is that visible interventions targeted at specific places can complement these efforts, likely by providing positive economic output and reducing the sense of neglect in the short run, which could make it easier to build support for structural reforms. The TdF illustrates this dynamic by concentrating economic activity and national visibility in peripheral municipalities. Similar effects may arise from other rotating sporting and cultural events, such as the Giro d'Italia, major football tournaments, or national festivals that move across regions. Beyond sport and culture, other types of place based interventions may also operate through similar mechanisms. Future research should assess which interventions generate lasting effects and under what conditions they are most likely to moderate protest voting.

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Appendix

## A   Far-Right Voting in France

Figure A1: Trends in far-right voting in French legislative (left) and presidential (right) elections over time.


Figure A2: Distribution of far-right vote in the poorest vs. wealthiest quartiles of municipalities in the 2022 election.

B   Using 1974-2022 data

	Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share			
	(in standard deviations)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Presidential Vote				
TDF (indicator)	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01^{***}	-0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	12%	12%	12%	12%
National Average	18%	18%	18%	18%
Num. observations	265440	265440	244959	165612
Num. municipalities	33180	33180	30620	33017
Num. elections	8	8	8	8
Panel B: Legislative Vote				
TDF (indicator)	-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.03^{***}	-0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	9%	9%	9%	9%
National Average	13%	13%	13%	13%
Num. observations	307008	307008	278359	183770
Num. municipalities	34112	34112	30929	33866
Num. elections	9	9	9	9
Controls				
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Departure/arrival city		✓		
Extended controls			✓	
Sample restrictions				
Eventually exposed to TdF			✓	
No departure/arrival cities			✓	
Less than 30km from the route				✓

$^{***}p < 0.001;\ ^{**}p < 0.01;\ ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A1: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in presidential and legislative elections, 1974–2022. Panel A reports presidential results and Panel B legislative results. The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

C   Treatment Effect by Election Year

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share				
	(in standard deviations)				
	2002	2007	2012	2017	2022
Panel A: Presidential					
TDF (indicator)	−0.00	−0.00	0.02***	−0.02***	−0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. observations	10862	10739	9241	9752	9737
SD of Dep. Var.	7%	5%	7%	9%	10%
National Average	17%	13%	21%	26%	36%
Panel B: Legislative					
TDF (indicator)	−0.03***	−0.00	0.03***	−0.06**	−0.16***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. observations	11327	11134	9325	10271	10098
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	5%	15%	16%	28%
National Average	6%	3%	7%	8%	11%

$^{***}p < 0.001;\ ^{**}p < 0.01;\ ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A2: Estimated treatment effects of Tour de France exposure on far-right vote share by election year, using *fect*. The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

D   Using 2002-2017 Data

| | Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share (in standard deviations) | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Presidential Vote				
TdF (indicator)	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	9%	9%	9%	9%
National Average	19%	19%	19%	19%
Num. observations	132720	132720	108580	95450
Num. municipalities	33180	33180	27145	32905
Num. elections	4	4	4	4
Panel B: Legislative Vote				
TdF (indicator)	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	8%	8%	8%	8%
National Average	12%	12%	12%	11%
Num. observations	136448	136448	112024	98433
Num. municipalities	34112	34112	28006	33853
Num. elections	4	4	4	4
Controls				
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Departure/arrival city		✓		
Extended controls			✓	
Sample restrictions				
Eventually exposed to TdF			✓	
No departure/arrival cities			✓	
Less than 30km from the route				✓

$^{***}p < 0.001;\ ^{**}p < 0.01;\ ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A3: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in presidential and legislative elections, 2002–2017. Panel A reports results for presidential elections and Panel B for legislative elections. Columns add controls and restrictions sequentially. The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

E   Estimation Results Table Obtained by *fect*

	ATT (treated **observations** weighted equally)	ATT (treated **units** weighted equally)
	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Presidential Vote		
TDF (indicator)	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%
National Average	23%	23%
Num. observations	165900	165900
Panel B: Legislative Vote		
TDF (indicator)	−0.04***	−0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%
National Average	15%	15%
Num. observations	170560	170560

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table A4: Estimation results obtained by *fect* (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2024). The outcome is measured in standard deviations. Units are here municipalities.

F   All Specifications

Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share (measured in standard deviations)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Presidential Vote									
TDF (indicator)	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%
National Average	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%	23%	22%
Num. observations	165900	165900	165899	165899	165899	165899	165899	164109	135724
Num. municipalities	33180	33180	33180	33180	33180	33180	33180	32822	27145
Num. elections	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Panel B: Legislative Vote									
TDF (indicator)	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%
National Average	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%
Num. observations	170560	170560	170560	170538	170538	170538	170538	168653	140028
Num. municipalities	34112	34112	34112	34108	34108	34108	34108	33731	28006
Num. elections	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Controls									
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Departures/Arrivals		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Taxation						✓	✓	✓	✓
Past Election Results							✓	✓	✓
Sample restrictions									
Eventually exposed to TdF									✓
No departure/arrival cities								✓	✓

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A5: Treatment effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share under alternative model specifications. Panel A reports estimates for presidential elections and Panel B for legislative elections (2002–2022). Each column adds sets of controls or sample restrictions. The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

G Clustering at the Stage (Étape) Level

	Main specification	Main specification with clustering at the stage (étape) level
	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Presidential Vote		
TDF (indicator)	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.01)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%
National Average	23%	23%
Num. observations	165900	165900
Num. municipalities	33180	33180
Num. elections	5	5
Panel B: Legislative Vote		
TDF (indicator)	−0.04***	−0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.01)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%
National Average	15%	15%
Num. observations	170560	170560
Num. municipalities	34112	34112
Num. elections	5	5
Controls		
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A6: Treatment effects of TdF exposure on far-right vote share using clustering at the stage (étape) level. Panel A reports estimates for presidential elections and Panel B for legislative elections (2002–2022). Each column adds sets of controls or sample restrictions. The outcome is measured in standard deviations. The p-values are relatively larger in the specifications with clustering (2), as expected.

H   Persistence of the Effects

We test for the persistence of the treatment, using a model that includes indicators for the number of years since a municipality last hosted the TdF:

$$Y_{mt} = \sum_{i=1}^{5} \beta_i \mathbb{I}(\text{years since TdF}_{mt} = i) + \gamma X_{mt} + \delta_m + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{mt}. \tag{3}$$

Here, $\mathbb{I}(\text{years since TdF}_{mt} = i)$ is an indicator equal to one if municipality m was on the TdF route i years before the election in year t, and zero otherwise. This specification allows us to trace the trajectory of treatment effects and assess whether they persist, decay, or grow over time.


Figure A3: Persistence of the TdF effect on far-right vote share in presidential (top) and legislative (bottom) elections, by years since last exposure. The outcome is measured in standard deviations. Regression results are presented in Appendix Table A7.

	Outcome: Vote Share (in standard deviations)	
	Presidential Elections	**Legislative Elections**
	(1)	(2)
TDF (t-1)	−0.03***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
TDF (t-2)	−0.04***	−0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
TDF (t-3)	−0.02***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
TDF (t-4)	−0.00	−0.02
	(0.00)	(0.00)
TDF (t-5)	−0.01**	−0.04**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	165900	170560
Num. municipalities	33180	34112
Num. elections	5	5
Controls		
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A7: Persistence of the TdF effect on far-right vote share in presidential and legislative elections (2002-22). The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

I Marginal Effects of TdF Exposure

Figure A4: Marginal effects of TdF exposure on presidential far-right vote share across local economic conditions and previous far-right voting.


Figure A5: Marginal effects of TdF exposure on legislative far-right vote share across local economic conditions and previous far-right voting.

J Effect on Voting for Other Parties

J.1 Far Left

	Outcome: Far-Left Vote Share (measured in standard deviations)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Presidential			
TDF (indicator)	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	163435	163435	133674
Num. municipalities	32687	32687	26735
Num. elections	5	5	5
Panel B: Legislative			
TDF (indicator)	0.02^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	129148	129148	98692
Num. municipalities	32287	32287	24673
Num. elections	4	4	4
Controls			
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Departure/arrival city		✓	
Extended controls			✓
Sample restrictions			
Eventually exposed to TdF			✓
No departure/arrival cities			✓

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A8: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on voting for the far left in presidential and legislative elections (2002-22). The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

J.2 Mainstream Left

	Outcome: Left-Wing Vote Share (measured in standard deviations)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Presidential			
TDF (indicator)	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. obs.	163420	163420	133659
Num. municipalities	32684	32684	26732
Num. elections	5	5	5
Panel B: Legislative			
TDF (indicator)	0.01**	0.01*	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	161355	161355	132158
Num. municipalities	32271	32271	26432
Num. elections	5	5	5
Controls			
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Departure/arrival city		✓	
Extended controls			✓
Sample restrictions			
Eventually exposed to TdF			✓
No departure/arrival cities			✓

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A9: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on voting for the left in presidential and legislative elections (2002-22). The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

J.3 Center

	Outcome: Center Vote Share (measured in standard deviations)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Presidential			
TDF (indicator)	0.00	0.01	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	171275	171275	140434
Num. municipalities	34255	34255	28087
Num. elections	5	5	5
Panel B: Legislative			
TDF (indicator)	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	161325	161325	132133
Num. municipalities	32265	32265	26427
Num. elections	5	5	5
Controls			
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Departure/arrival city		✓	
Extended controls			✓
Sample restrictions			
Eventually exposed to TdF			✓
No departure/arrival cities			✓

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A10: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on voting for the center in presidential and legislative elections (2002-22). The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

J.4 Right

	Outcome: Right-Wing Vote Share (measured in standard deviations)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: First Table			
TDF (indicator)	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	163395	163395	133639
Num. municipalities	32679	32679	26728
Num. elections	5	5	5
Panel B: Second Table			
TDF (indicator)	0.00	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	161370	161370	132168
Num. municipalities	32274	32274	26434
Num. elections	5	5	5
Controls			
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓
Departure/arrival city		✓	
Extended controls			✓
Sample restrictions			
Eventually exposed to TdF			✓
No departure/arrival cities			✓

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A11: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on voting for the right in presidential and legislative elections (2002-22). The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

K Sensitivity to Distance Threshold for TDF Exposure

| | **Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share** | | | |
| | **(measured in standard deviations)** | | | |
	5km	**10km**	15km	20km
Panel A: Presidential Vote				
TDF (indicator)	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.03***	−0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%	11%	11%
National Average	23%	23%	23%	23%
Num. observations	165900	165900	170560	170560
Num. municipalities	33180	33180	34112	34112
Num. elections	5	5	5	5
Panel B: Legislative Vote				
TDF (indicator)	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.05***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%	11%	11%
National Average	15%	15%	15%	15%
Num. observations	170560	170560	170560	170560
Num. municipalities	34112	34112	34112	34112
Num. elections	5	5	5	5
Controls:				
Municipality fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓	✓

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A12: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on voting for the far right in presidential and legislative elections (2002-22) using different distance thresholds (the baseline specification uses 10 km). The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

L   Alternative Treatment Definition

L.1   Once Treated, Always Treated Exposure to the TdF

**Presidential Elections**

Legislative Elections

Figure A6: Event-study estimates of the treatment effect of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in presidential (top) and legislative (bottom) elections. In this specification, TdF exposure is treated as a permanent condition once it occurs. The estimates are based on the counterfactual imputation estimator. Regression results are presented in Appendix Table A13.

	ATT (treated **observations** weighted equally) (1)	ATT (treated **units** weighted equally) (2)
Panel A: Presidential Vote		
TDF (indicator)	-0.04^{**}	-0.05^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%
National Average	23%	23%
Num. observations	165900	165900
Panel B: Legislative Vote		
TDF (indicator)	-0.03^{***}	-0.05^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
SD of Dep. Var.	11%	11%
National Average	15%	15%
Num. observations	170560	170560

$^{***}p < 0.001;\ ^{**}p < 0.01;\ ^{*}p < 0.05.$

Table A13: Estimation results obtained by *fect* (Liu, Wang, and Xu 2024). The outcome is measured in standard deviations. Units are here municipalities.

L.2 Exposure Reversal to the TdF: Treatment Switching-Off

Presidential Elections

Elections Since TDF Reversal

Legislative Elections

Elections Since TDF Reversal

Figure A7: Event-study estimates of the reversal treatment effect of TdF exposure on far-right vote share in presidential (top) and legislative (bottom) elections. In this specification, TdF exposure being switched-off instead of switched-on. The estimates are based on the counterfactual imputation estimator. Regression results are presented in Appendix Table A14.

	Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share		
	(measured in standard deviations)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	T0	T1	T2
Panel A: Presidential			
TDF (indicator)	−0.00	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	25165	25165	13799
Panel B: Legislative			
TDF (indicator)	−0.01***	−0.00	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Num. observations	26137	26137	14174

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A14: Estimated treatment effects of Tour de France exposure being switched-off (instead of switched-on) on far-right vote share, using *fect*. The outcome is measured in standard deviations.

M   Alternative Geographic Units of Analysis

	Outcome: Far-Right Vote Share (measured in standard deviations)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Presidential			
TDF (indicator)	−0.03***	−0.04***	−0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
SD of Dep. Var.	0.113	0.098	0.094
Num. observations	173930	8405	1435
Num. municipalities	34786		
Num. living zones		1681	
Num. commuting zones			287
Num. elections	5	5	5
Panel B: Legislative			
TDF (indicator)	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
SD of Dep. Var.	0.107	0.094	0.092
Num. observations	174165	8405	1435
Num. municipalities	32287		
Num. living zones		1681	
Num. commuting zones			287
Num. elections	5	5	5
Controls:			
Municipality fixed effect	✓		
Living zone fixed effect		✓	
Commuting zone fixed effect			✓
Election fixed effect	✓	✓	✓

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table A15: Estimated treatment effects of TdF exposure on voting for the far right in presidential and legislative elections (2002-22), estimated for different level of aggregation. The outcome is measured in standard deviations. LZ and CZ stand for living zone and commuting zone respectively. Living zones are geographic areas defined by INSEE to reflect the space within which residents have access to daily services and amenities. Commuting zones are larger functional areas based on commuting patterns, encompassing municipalities where most residents work within the same area, capturing local labor markets.

N   Additional Randomization Inference: Restricting to Units that were on the Route at Least Once


Figure A8: Distribution of placebo treatment effects from 1,000 random assignments of TdF exposure (within year) across municipalities at least treated once during the period of analysis. The vertical red line indicates the true estimated effect.

O   Survey Questionnaire and Additional Results

O.1 Questionnaire

Note: This appendix reproduces the survey questions. Response scales are indicated once per block when identical.

Exposure and Cycling

The ordering of this section was randomized in a priming experiment, where some people saw it before the questions about attitudes and political views and others saw it after. The open text mechanism question was only asked in the post TdF survey.

1. To the best of your knowledge, has any stage of the Tour de France passed through (or started or finished) in your town or neighborhood this year? (Yes / No / Not sure)

2. Did you watch or attend any part of the Tour de France (in person or on TV) this year? (Yes / No / Not sure)

3. Do you think the Tour de France had a positive, negative, or no impact on your town this year? (Positive / Negative / No impact / Not sure)

4. Would you like to see the Tour de France come to your town next year? (Yes / No / Not sure)

5. How often do you ride a bike in a typical week? (Never; 1–2 times; 3–5 times; Almost every day; Prefer not to say)

6. If you follow the Tour de France, which team do you usually cheer for? (Open text)

7. Who is your favorite cyclist of all time? (Open text)

8. How has the Tour de France influenced how you (or others) perceive your town? (Open text)

Town Perceptions

Scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly agree, Don't know.

1. People elsewhere in France know about my town.

2. Local businesses in my area are struggling to stay open.

3. I feel proud to be from my town.

4. It's hard to find a good job in this area.
5. Our town often gets overlooked by national media and politicians.
6. My town has become more economically dynamic in recent years.
7. There are few opportunities to celebrate local culture and traditions publicly.
8. I've noticed more tourists visiting my town recently.
9. My community has recently received positive national attention.
10. Public investment in our area has been neglected.
11. Towns like mine are often portrayed in a negative light in national conversations.
12. I believe national events can help small towns like mine get the recognition they deserve.
13. Prices are rising, and many people here are struggling financially.
14. Roads and infrastructure in my area are in good condition.

Identities
Scale: Not at all important, A little important, Very important, Extremely important.
1. Your local community or city
2. Your nationality (French)
3. Your origin
4. Your gender
5. Your religion or spirituality
6. Your political beliefs

National Issues
Scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly agree, Don't know.
1. Immigration to France should be severely reduced.
2. The euro has been good for the French economy.
3. Islam is compatible with French values.
4. Traditional French culture is threatened by globalization.

Vote Intention and Party Evaluations
1. If a general election were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for? *Options: Rassemblement National (RN); La France Insoumise (LFI); Les Républicains (LR); Parti Socialiste (PS); Renaissance; Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV); Parti Communiste Français (PCF); Reconquête; Prefer not to say; Blank; Would not vote*
2. Please rate how you feel about the following parties on a scale from 0 (very unfavorable) to 10 (very favorable): RN; LFI; Renaissance; Reconquête.
3. Which party did you vote for in the first round of the 2022 presidential election? *Options: RN; LFI; LR; PS; Renaissance; EELV; PCF; Reconquête; Other; Blank; Did not vote; Prefer not to say*

Town Atmosphere (Open text)
1. In your own words, how would you describe the current atmosphere in your town?

Attention Check
1. Select only "Dog" and "Cat" below. (Dog; Cat; Bird; Fish; Snake)

Background
1. What is your age group? (18–24; 25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55–64; 65+; Prefer not to say)
2. What is your gender? (Male; Female; Non-binary/third gender; Prefer not to say)
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (No diploma; Secondary education; Vocational training; University degree; Postgraduate degree; Prefer not to say)
4. What is your current employment status? (Employed; Self-employed; Unemployed; Student; Retired; Other; Prefer not to say)

5. What is your household's monthly income (net)? (Under €1,000; €1,000–1,999; €2,000–2,999; €3,000–3,999; €4,000 or more; Prefer not to say)

6. What is your nationality? (French; Foreigner — specify)

Behavioral Follow-up

1. Which political party would you like to sign up for to receive their newsletter and updates?
   Options: RN; LFI; LR; PS; Renaissance; EELV; PCF; Reconquête; None

O.2 Additional Survey Results

	Symbolic	Economic	FR Thermo.	FR Policies	FR Newsletter
Post	−0.084	−0.076	−0.172	0.072	0.005
	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.232)	(0.087)	(0.016)
Treated	0.298**	0.114	−0.349	−0.163	0.006
	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.269)	(0.098)	(0.025)
DiD: Post × Treated	0.411**	0.171	0.393	0.088	−0.014
	(0.150)	(0.141)	(0.364)	(0.140)	(0.027)
Observations	848	847	850	843	850
R^2	0.110	0.145	0.151	0.238	0.102

$^{***}p < 0.001;\ ^{**}p < 0.01;\ ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A16: Estimated difference-in-differences effects of TdF exposure on symbolic and economic perceptions, as well as far-right attitudes, from the two-wave 2025 survey experiment. Outcomes are standardized indices or scales, measured in standard deviations. Models include controls for age, gender, education, income, employment, and survey source. Results should be interpreted as suggestive given the non-representative sampling frame and changing sample composition across waves.

**(a)** Indices — Watched TdF

(b) Far-right — Watched TdF


(c) Indices — Prior far-right vote (2022)

**(d)** Far-right — Prior far-right vote (2022)

(e) Indices — Income

(f) Far-right — Income

(g) Indices — Age

(h) Far-right — Age

Figure A9: Survey difference-in-differences estimates by subgroups. Left column: effects on the Symbolic and Economic indices (both standardized). Right column: effects on attitudes toward the far right (policy index, thermometer) and the behavioral sign-up measure. Rows split respondents by (1) whether they watched the TdF, (2) whether they reported voting far-right in 2022, (3) income, and (4) age. Points show estimates; thick bars are 90% CIs; thin bars 95% CIs.

A24

(a) DID Estimates — Far-right Outcomes

(b) Pre/Post Means — Far-right (Full Sample)

Figure A10: Survey difference-in-differences results and robustness. Left: DID point estimates for far-right outcomes with 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) CIs. Right: pre/post means for the same outcomes using the full sample as a descriptive robustness check.

(a) Pre/Post Means — Economic & Symbolic Indices

(b) Pre/Post Means — Far-right Outcomes

Figure A11: Survey pre/post means excluding the Facebook data. Points are means; vertical bars show 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) CIs. Left: standardized Economic and Symbolic indices. Right: far-right policy index (standardized), thermometer (0–10), and newsletter signup (0/1).


Figure A12: Effects of priming experiment on survey outcomes. Left panel: Difference in means for the symbolic and economic indices (z-scores). Right panel: Difference in means for political outcomes: far-right feeling thermometer, far-right policies index, and far-right newsletter sign-up. Points show estimated effects with 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) confidence intervals. Results indicate positive effects on symbolic recognition and economic perceptions, but no clear effects on far-right preferences.

A25